Analysts use the preseason to get ready for the upcoming season by devising strategies to counteract opponents’ advantages and highlight their disadvantages.
Scoring goals is the primary objective of the game, as it has been since humans first began kicking a ball about a predetermined area of land. It helps if you can work the ball into risky locations to produce high-value opportunities. A team can enter the penalty area in one of two ways: by carrying the ball into the box on your own, or by passing it to a teammate.
The Athletic’s new box-entry graphic can visualise the approach taken by each team, and outline which players are the most prolific in advancing the play.
The new box-entry graphic from The Athletic may be used to visualize each team’s stratePrior to stepping on the accelerator and racing into the upcoming season, it is a good idea to take a quick look back and review the attacking strategies employed by the top eight teams in 2023–2024.gy and highlight the players who are most effective at moving the action along.
It might just provide some clues for analysts to unpack…
Last year, the champs’ offensive strategy was obvious: dribble down the left and cross from the right.
The addition of Jeremy Doku added a lot of entertainment to City’s left flank. After giving the touchline a hug, the 22-year-old would yell, “Meep meep,” and start to drive for the penalty area. Due in part to the Belgian Road Runner’s form, Jack Grealish, his closest teammate, saw his Premier League minutes decline to the lowest of his career, with just 132 carries into the box, almost three times as many as he had. Grealish managed 4.4 carries into the box per ninety minutes, whereas Doku made 7.5.
The solid arrows below, which average the most frequent clusters in the dataset, demonstrate how well-traveled that route was by Doku: receive the ball wide and drive to the half-space. Repeat after rinsing.
The right half of the city was much more complex. City would continuously wear down the defense with wide crosses from an overlapping (or underlapping) Kevin De Bruyne, sophisticated through balls from Phil Foden or Bernardo Silva, and zipping passes into forwards from Rodri.
The technical specialists’ probing passes will persist, but if Pep Guardiola moves the brave dribbler Savinho to a right-sided attacking role, he may force the team to double down on pacy wingers on both flanks. In 2023–24, the Brazilian made more take-on attempts than any other La Liga player.
The city has historically punished its citizens in a variety of ways. Although last season’s patterns to get to the penalty area were widely known, will they change their style this year?
Their graphic passes the eye test immediately.
As Arsenal’s most frequent carriers into the penalty area, Gabriel Martinelli and Bukayo Saka led the way. It is interesting to note that a significant portion of them started outside the penalty area, as supported by shaded heatmap zones.
Most of the previous season, Arsenal’s dynamic wingers were under constant surveillance. When Arsenal’s wide players drove to the byline, they usually circumvented the opposition’s unyielding defensive block.
The delivery of balls into the box by Arsenal fits in well with their carry plan, especially on the right side where Saka’s carries are mirrored by Martin Odegaard’s deftness in floating into the half-space and providing a threaded ball to his charging colleague.
Odegaard’s 216 passes into the penalty area far outnumber those of the rest of the team, and it is not unexpected that the top three players to pass or cross into the box were Saka, Ben White, and Arsenal’s captain on the right side of the triangle.
“We’re really big on playing ‘same side’,” Declan Rice told The Athletic a few months ago, concerning Arsenal’s propensity to probe down one flank instead of switching the play.
You may see those right-sided rotations when you close your eyes. As the image below illustrates, manager Mikel Arteta’s strategy was to direct their attacks down that flank more frequently.
Less fluidity was there on Arsenal’s left side, but Riccardo Calafiori, a recent addition, could cause a good disruption to the attacking dynamic in the upcoming campaign. For the time being, the only surefire strategy to keep Arteta out of your penalty area is to stop him on his right flank.
It seems strange to argue that Jurgen Klopp’s Liverpool had a width problem in his last season at the club, given that the German coach’s team was known for having flying full-backs for much of his time.
After assuming a more prominent role in their build-up, Trent Alexander-Arnold saw less of Liverpool’s fearsome right-sided triangles than in prior seasons. It was less common for Klopp’s team to get past the opposition’s defensive block; their rate of 13.6 open-play crosses per ninety minutes was the lowest since the 2018–19 campaign.
Though you can see below that there is a greater percentage of passes completed between the width of the penalty area than outside of it, with significantly less action from the left flank, Alexander-Arnold was still Liverpool’s most prolific passer into the box.
Liverpool attempted to focus their attack on vital areas, but occasionally got caught up in the congestion.
Rather, Liverpool’s wingers kept the breadth. Because Mohamed Salah’s role gradually changed from dribbling to being more creative, Luis Diaz was by far Liverpool’s most dangerous and productive ball carrier in the team.
The Colombian’s lack of final product has occasionally irritated supporters, but he does have a magnetic quality that draws opposition defenders to him and creates room for others.
Early indications point to the potential return of Liverpool’s wide threat this season as Arne Slot pushes his full-backs to overlap or undercut the man in possession of the ball. After ten games of the new season, this graphic will show more symmetry in Liverpool’s passes and crosses into the box.
Arne Slot, Liverpool’s new head coach
Ollie Watkins enjoyed the most prolific goalscoring campaign of his Premier League career in 2023-24 as he spearheaded Villa’s attack with 19 goals.
Watkins played more on the defender’s shoulder between the six-yard box under Unai Emery’s direction, but he frequently pulled into the inside left channel to advance and cut in with his stronger right foot. As you can see, Watkins was in charge of the most carries into the box during the campaign.
On the other flank, Moussa Diaby and Leon Bailey were among Villa’s most prolific ball carriers — the latter often hugging the touchline before making those out-to-in runs forward.
Villa may be lacking in ball-carrying danger as a result of Diaby’s move to Al Ittihad, but Jadon Philogene’s return—he gave Hull City a comparable skill set in the Championship—might be the ideal offensive spark.
Left-back Among all Villa players, Lucas Digne had the highest rate of delivery into the box (4.6 open-play crosses per 90), much outpacing the next closest player. On the other hand, the most popular pass clusters, which take into account the beginning and ending points of a specific activity, are not displayed on the left.
This probably has to do with the different cross-end locations that Digne has compared to Villa’s right flank, where Bailey or John McGinn would often try to pass to the back post.
Villa’s offense will seem different as a result of their actions throughout the transfer window. Things on their left flank are probably going to get agitated when Ian Maatsen arrives, as his powerful acceleration gets him near the byline. More than any other team on this list, Emery’s team will change in strategy as they play in the Champions League/European Cup for the first time since 1983.
Spurs’ 312 carries into the penalty area last season were surpassed only by Manchester City.
Ange Postecoglou’s style is all about width, and Spurs’ primary means of getting the ball into the box came via the out-to-in runs of right wing Dejan Kulusevski and left wing Son Heung-min. In 2023–24, the two were also the main producers of open-play opportunities for Tottenham.
Son had plenty of action as a central striker, but his ability to go to the left and make daring runs from a distance will always be a valuable asset to his repertoire.
Kulusevski has a dual risk. He has the ability to advance the ball himself or give a crafty pass to runners who are approaching the box. The only player who got into the area more frequently than him was Pedro Porro, the right-back, whose underlapping runs were a mainstay of Spurs’ offensive play.
Throughout Postecoglou’s managerial career, low, driven crosses from one flank to the winger arriving from the opposite flank have been a recurring theme. This pattern is graphically represented here. With an additional preseason to solidify his concepts, Spurs should intensify their offensive strategy with even more zeal.
Chelsea’s attack gained strength last season, scoring 77 goals, their greatest total in seven years, despite a dismal defensive comeback.
At first, Raheem Sterling seemed to be returning to his former self, becoming the prolific dribbler that made him famous during his adolescent years. He rotated between both flanks and had more carries into the box than any Chelsea player, even though his minutes were later restricted.
Chelsea developed an offensive balance at the conclusion of the season with dangerous ball carriers Noni Madueke and Mykhailo Mudryk flanking the elusive Cole Palmer as a No 10. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the three of them round out the top four.
Everything that made Chelsea’s assault under Mauricio Pochettino effective was mostly due to Palmer. The aforementioned image effectively illustrates the skew to the right side, where Palmer would frequently wreak havoc with threaded balls centrally or vicious deliveries from wide. The 22-year-old was the only player to tally more than 100 passes or crosses into the penalty box.
If the previous season is any indication, neutralizing Chelsea’s offensive threat will require halting them on the right flank. There are plenty of attacking options for Chelsea under new manager Enzo Maresca. Christopher Nkunku, who is healthy, is looking to overcome his injury issues and have a significant impact on Chelsea’s forward play by using his increased capacity to appear in left-hand channels.
Maresca’s tactical strategy revolves around width, but their primary goal is to balance their attacking threat from both flanks.
With runners on the left and conventional crossers on the right, their attacking strategy was not too unlike from that of Manchester City.
Because of his unrelenting sprinting, Antony Gordon was Newcastle’s most prolific ball carrier from the left touchline. Harvey Barnes, who was less frequently seen, was equally eager to drive inside and use one-on-one exchanges to bounce the ball off teammates.
Alexander Isak was positioned in between the two, and his lean physique let him push past opponents and carry most of the weight when he drove into the penalty area.
Kieran Trippier, the team’s most prolific wide-crosser, Bruno Guimaraes, and Miguel Almiron formed a revolving triangle that was the main focus of Newcastle’s right side. Of all the right-backs in the Premier League last season, only Malo Gusto of Chelsea produced more opportunities for open play than Trippier’s 1.4 per 90.
Newcastle’s delivery into the box was led by Guimaraes, and the two vertical average pass clusters aptly capture the kind of passes he makes from the right-central channel. Miguel Almiron’s strong off-ball running is frequently exploited by the Brazilian, who can find him with a looped pass over the top of the defence or a through ball.
Eddie Howe’s team has successfully employed certain offensive strategies in 2023–2024. The goal this season will be to increase the unpredictability of their approach moving ahead, having exceeded expectations when Howe first joined before faltering last year.
Manchester United’s football philosophy has always been to play direct, aggressive football with strong wide play. Although Erik ten Hag’s team appeared disoriented the previous season, Alejandro Garnacho and Marcus Rashford’s pace on the left flank gave them a legitimate danger.
With his daring running, Garnacho led United’s attacks into the penalty area, driving in from the left (and sometimes the right) wing toward the halfspace. As you can see below, there was an obvious attempt to use their left flank’s superior offensive ability to go into the final third.
There will be more driving runs if United can rekindle Jadon Sancho’s career at Old Trafford. During his loan stint at Borussia Dortmund, the 24-year-old’s 5.8 progressive carries per 90 were among the top two percent of wingers in the Bundesliga. Amad Diallo, who is making an impression in preseason after having a solid campaign finale, would be a more likely choice.
Ten Hag will want to strike a better balance between carrying and passing in his team’s attack. Bruno Fernandes leads United in passes into the box, which should come as no surprise, but his sheer volume of passes still makes you scratch your eyes.
The fact that he was the player most likely to feed United’s wingers’ runs and that his 216 crosses or passes into the box exceeded that of his closest teammate suggested that their delivery was noticeably skewed and one-dimensional.
United does not have a lot of crosses in its plays; only Sheffield United had fewer than their 1.3 crosses per 90 possessions. Nevertheless, their delivery has to be more varied. Although Luke Shaw’s absence from left-back was much felt, Rasmus Hojlund’s frustration with his inability to get the six-yard box on most of his runs can be greatly understood by looking at the image above.
The majority of United’s forward action is initiated by Fernandes, yet his high-risk, high-reward passes (along with Casemiro’s, for the curious) frequently result in attacking dead ends. It might be preferable for the team as a whole to distribute those deliveries.
For the next campaign, Ten Hag has a lot of things to work on, but one of the top priorities for United must be to change the predictability of their approach.
(Top photos: Getty Images)
